Friday, Dec. 10, 2004 | 5:38 a.m.
John B. Alexander, who lives in Las Vegas, was a colonel in the U.S. Army and is the author of "Winning The War" (St. Martin's Press).
WEEKEND EDITION
December 11 - 12, 2004
"You go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you want, or wish to have, at a later time." With those words last week, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld derisively dismissed a legitimate question from Specialist Thomas Wilson, a National Guard soldier from Tennessee, who is serving in Kuwait.
The question dealt with why our troops in that theater do not have adequate armor for their vehicles. With that answer, Rumsfeld once again eschewed his personal responsibility for adequately providing the resources necessary to fight the war.
Taken at face value, one might believe Secretary Rumsfeld. But the problem goes far deeper and reflects a pattern of behavior that is detrimental to the security of the United States and undermines the confidence of the American public.
Even before 9/11 Secretary Rumsfeld was warned that the active Army was too small to handle the existing requirements for repeated deployments. Further, it was already established that the active forces would be severely stretched should they face a major contingency, such as Iraq. Instead of bolstering much needed personnel, he opted for support of high technology solutions.
Like Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara before him, Rumsfeld believed that America's technological advantage alone provided the military superiority necessary to defeat all potential adversaries.
Rumsfeld was not alone in his pre-9/11 assessment that the existing U.S. military was adequate to defeat any threat on the immediate horizon. Many professional military analysts also believed we had a decade, or more, before we would be challenged. They bet on that assumption, and they bet wrong.
A new, unconventional threat emerged, looked for asymmetric vulnerabilities, and found them. The devastating attacks on New York and Washington proved that.
Three years ago we responded with Operation Enduring Freedom, which quickly defeated the Taliban in Afghanistan. Reliant on CIA and special operations forces backed by high technology weapons and piles of money, Usama bin Laden and his terrorist organization were put on the run, at least temporarily. That experience reinforced Rumsfeld's notion that high technology could easily prevail and minimized the need for boots on the ground.
Then the Bush administration turned its attention to Iraq. Based on inaccurate intelligence and a false sense of urgency, the decision was made to invade Iraq. In the planning phase Rumsfeld was repeatedly warned about post-conflict difficulties and the number of troops that would be necessary to conduct both combat and stability operations.
Then-Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen. Eric Shinseki, told Congress that several hundred thousand troops would be needed. For his efforts Rumsfeld marginalized General Shinseki by prematurely announcing his replacement. Later, Secretary of the Army Thomas White provided similar testimony before Congress and was summarily fired.
When Gen. Tommy Franks, the Commander of U.S. Central Command, first presented his war plans for Iraq, they called for 400,000 troops in the theater. Secretary Rumsfeld repeatedly sent Gen. Franks back to the drawing board until he presented a plan that incorporated slightly over 100,000 troops.
In essence, he created a very sharp spear tip with virtually no shaft behind it, a fact that became apparent soon after the invasion was launched. Saddam fell quickly, but major problems of local stability emerged immediately.
The post-war turmoil was not unanticipated. Long before the invasion, experienced officers had noted that establishing stability was the most serious issue associated with invading Iraq. The senior civilians at the Department of Defense brushed those concerns aside. When asked about the impending problems, their response was that the Defense Department would fight the war and stability was a White House responsibility.
Later, when asked in a television interview if an adequate number of troops had been provided, Rumsfeld responded by stating he "gave the military what they asked for." That is simply not true and is another example of Rumsfeld ducking personal responsibility. It was his badgering that had driven the number down.
Further, it was well known that tanks and other heavy armor were not best-suited for stability operations. While they offer troop protection, the weight and treads of such vehicles do extensive damage to the roads.
Based on experience in Bosnia and other hostile areas, the requirements for vehicles necessary in stability operations were firmly established. Now, nearly two years into the conflict, Secretary Rumsfeld blames American industry for their inability to produce the much-needed armored Humvees fast enough to meet demand.
From the beginning of the Iraq conflict it was necessary to call up reserve and National Guard units en masse. They now bear the brunt of the casualties.
To maintain troop strength the Department of Defense has instituted "stop-loss" programs that prevents service members from leaving at the end of their commitments. In addition, thousands of men and women, some long off active duty, are being recalled from the Individual Ready Reserve. Many of them had no inkling they were still eligible for recall.
To their questions, Rumsfeld again weaves and dodges, blaming these soldiers for not reading the most obscure fine print in their contracts. Many believe these actions constitutes a de facto draft, although the administration is doing everything possible to avoid using that word.
In short, Mr. Secretary, providing the resources for war is your responsibility. Blaming others now as things go awry is not befitting the office. You were told, and told repeatedly, of the dangers associated with invading Iraq.
The questions about personnel and materiel should have been addressed before the Iraq invasion was undertaken. It is time for you to stop blaming others and accept personal responsibility for the shortfalls.
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