Editorial: Panacea turns into nightmare

Wednesday, Aug. 25, 1999 | 10:02 a.m.

In the late 1980s Congress found that child support payments weren't getting to parents who had custody fast enough and that "deadbeat parents" needed to be hunted down more quickly. Seeking to reverse this trend, a federal law was passed in 1988 that mandated states to have a single computer system to enforce child support payments. In turn, Nevada's state Welfare Division determined that not only should a new system be devised to track child support, but also that any system should include food stamps and Medicaid eligibility as well.

So what's happened in the intervening decade as Nevada tried to become the only state to develop such a multi-faceted computer system? As the Sun's Cy Ryan reported in a story Sunday that documented the troubled history of the program, what started out as a well-intentioned undertaking to be finished in three years has become saddled with delay upon delay. The project still isn't finished and what initially was estimated to cost $22.6 million has seen its price tag explode, costing $88.8 million so far. Ultimately as much as $100 million could be spent on the project, and some state legislators fear that the program eventually will never be brought online.

There's plenty of blame to go around. The Welfare Division didn't adequately forecast the complexity of this venture. While the 1989 Legislature approved money for the project's go-ahead, Gov. Bob Miller froze these funds for two years, which the then-Welfare Division director said resulted in many qualified contractors being taken by other states. The contractors hired by the state to create the system also kept missing deadlines. The Legislature isn't blameless, either, refusing Miller's request in 1997 to hire a full-time state project manager to ride herd. Only in 1999, after newly elected Gov. Kenny Guinn requested the $125,000 position, did the Legislature agree to hire a project manager. One lesson to be learned from this mess is how the lack of coordination and accountability within state government can seal the fate of a struggling program.

In addition, sometimes what happens with government is similar to the plight of gamblers, even those who at the outset of their wagering vow to abide by self-imposed limits. What occurs too often is that some lose their resolve, rationalizing to themselves, "I've hit my limit of $500, but maybe I should go ahead and risk another $100 and try to make up for some of my losses. After all, my luck certainly is bound to change for the better." What frequently happens instead is that the gambler loses even more, essentially throwing good money after bad. Regarding the project's future, while Guinn is willing to spend more money now, he says he won't settle for any more delays, suggesting that if it isn't completed by October 2000 the project may finally meet its demise. If that day unfortunately arrives and it isn't ready, Guinn should indeed pull the plug on th is well-meaning but overly ambitious effort.